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JUSTICE IN THE TIME OF TERROR 
Sharon L. Davies* 
DEFENDING MOHAMMAD: JUSTICE ON TRIAL. By Robert E. Precht. 
Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 2003. Pp. xi, 183. $22.95. 
On my drive into work recently I found myself behind a Ford 
pickup truck and noticed its bumper sticker: "When the going gets 
tough, I get a machine gun." Not a doctor. Not a counselor or 
mediator. Not a shelter for cover. Not the wisdom of a favored advisor 
or a proven friend. But a machine gun. How odd, I thought, to prefer a 
weapon incapable of identifying with any precision, any careful 
thought, where the enemy of the wielder of it might actually be 
hidden. A weapon as apt to injure non-targets as targets. A weapon 
mindless of its unintended consequences, and one that exhibits no 
inkling that such acts of aggression, whether capable of justification or 
not, are more likely to be met with hatred and more violence than 
concessions of desert and a laying down of arms. How odd, and yet 
how disturbingly familiar. 
I wondered about the thought processes that might have led the 
driver of the truck to place such a sentiment on his bumper for all the 
world to see. What emotion, what belief might lead a person to 
conclude that, out of all the options available, a machine gun was the 
right choice to deal with goings tough? And then I had it: Fear. 
To someone fearful of being seriously injured or perhaps even 
killed by another, I supposed, a machine gun could appear to be a 
perfectly reasonable weapon of choice. Perhaps especially if the other 
was a stranger, with unfamiliar ways, whose very lack of familiarity, of 
sameness, seemed to make him unpredictable, threatening, worthy of 
suspicion and distrust. Even more so if there were many such "others," 
who by their very numbers became an even greater threat, perhaps 
particularly if they lurked in places unknown, amidst innocents, to 
make their detection all the more difficult - and necessary. In the 
mind of the machine gun wielder, such a voluminous and elusive prey 
might warrant the choice of this particular firearm. 
* John C. Elam/Vorys Sater Designated Professor of Law, Moritz College of Law at the 
Ohio State University; J.D., 1987, Columbia University School of Law; B.A., 1984, 
University of Massachusetts at Amherst. - Ed. I would like to thank Professors Yale 
Kamisar, Alan C. Michaels and Marc Spindelman for taking the time to read an earlier draft 
of this Review and sharing with me their thoughts. 
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If so, why then not a machine gun? Certainly such a weapon would 
intimidate most would-be transgressors. Might not that deterrence 
value by itself provide sufficient justification for choosing it rather 
than some other less threatening approach? And if it was used, its 
impressive fire power would certainly be more likely to bring down its 
intended foes than would a weapon demanding a more deliberate aim, 
a more precise calculation of who was and who was not sufficiently 
threatening to deserve to be a target. True, it might ensnare some 
innocents as well, but the gravity and imminence of some threats 
justify the incursion of some unwanted costs. 
The problem with this instinct, of course, is that history warns that, 
for all our strengths and talents, we may not be particularly skilled at 
assessing the gravity of threats and telling those who present real 
threats from those who don't. This is especially true in moments of 
national crisis and heightened public insecurity. Indeed, fear has been 
at the heart of most of history's misjudgments. It was fear that 
convinced so many in the 1940s, including the President,1 the Justice 
Department,2 and the nation's highest court,3 that the forced 
relocation of Japanese Americans into camps was a good and 
constitutionally defensible idea. We have since rethought the wisdom 
of that.4 
It was also fear that lay at the heart of the infamous Palmer Raids, 
the government's answer to a series of bombings that terrorized the 
country in 1919, including a mail bomb sent to Supreme Court Justice 
Oliver Wendell Holmes and another that detonated outside the home 
of then Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer.5 The nation's answer 
included a hasty piece of legislation that authorized the nationwide 
round-up of 6000 foreign nationals; individuals who were arrested not 
on suspicion of involvement in the terrorist bombings, but on charges 
of associating with the Communist Party and the Communist Labor 
Party.6 This was a blunt approach, and one that promised to sweep up 
far more individuals not connected to the bombing spree than to it. It 
was an answer calibrated to the heightened level of the nation's fear, 
not the reality of the threat. 
1. Exec. Order No. 9066, 3 C.F.R. 1092 (1938-1943). 
2. For excellent discussions of the detention program, see Robert Justin Goldstein, An 
American Gulag? Summary Arrest and Emergency Detention of Political Dissidents in the 
United States, 10 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 541, 558-61 (1978), and Eric L. Muller, 
Inference or Impact? Racial Profiling and the Internment's True Legacy, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. 
L. 103, 109 (2003). 
3. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
4. Take the apology of President Reagan to the Japanese American community. Julie 
Johnson, President Signs Law to Redress Wartime Wrong, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 1988, at A16. 
5. See David Cole, The New McCarthyism: Repeating History in the War on Terrorism, 
38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 16 (2003). 
6. See David Cole, Enemy Aliens, 54 STAN. L. REV. 953, 996-98 (2002). 
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In his book Defending Mohammad: Justice on Trial, Robert E. 
Precht7 worries a lot about fear - specifically, how fear might have 
"doomed" his client Mohammad Salameh's chance for a fair trial in 
1993 when Salameh, an illegal Palestinian immigrant, was charged 
along with three others (Nidal Ayyad, Mahmoud Abouhalima and 
Ahmad Ajaj)8 with planning and carrying out the first bombing of the 
World Trade Center (pp. 17-18). By any standard, the first bombing 
was a crime of intense national interest, and if Salameh's lawyer had 
any doubt about that, he was disabused of it when, following his first 
appearance as Mohammad's counsel, reporters literally pinned him 
against one of the stone pillars outside the Manhattan federal 
courthouse and peppered him with questions (p. 7). The bombing left 
six dead, injured more than one thousand others, and destroyed 
hundreds of millions of dollars in property (p. 64). Thus public calls 
for an aggressive investigative response in the wake of the attack were 
hardly surprising, and they were voiced well before the last body was 
discovered and removed from the debris (p. ix). The throngs of 
reporters who packed the courtroom throughout the trial were 
testament to the great interest in both the crime and the four 
defendants charged with involvement in it. 
Robert Precht and I did know each other, but we were not friends, 
when he tried the case that is the subject of his memoir, Defending 
Mohammad. Indeed, at the time, there was little chance that Precht 
and I would have seen eye-to-eye about much about the case, 
including the rightness of the accusations, the fair-mindedness of the 
prosecutors assigned to the case, and the manner in which United 
States District Court Judge Kevin Duffy presided over the trial.9 For 
in 1993, when Precht, an experienced Legal Services attorney working 
for the elite federal-defenders unit in Manhattan, found himself 
assigned to defend Mohammad Salameh (p. 3), I worked directly 
across the street as a federal prosecutor in the U.S. Attorneys Office 
for the Southern District of New York, the office responsible for 
Mohammad's prosecution. I was not involved in Mohammad 
Salameh's case, but I knew and admired the prosecutors who were. So 
I am quite sure that at the time of the trial neither Precht nor I would 
have predicted that, some ten years later, the editors of the Michigan 
7. Assistant Dean of Public Service, Michigan Law School. 
8. A fifth suspect, and the alleged mastermind of the bombing plot, was Ramzi Yousef, 
a fugitive believed to be hiding out throughout the trial in Iraq. See p. 18. 
9. We still disagree about much relating to the way in which the trial was conducted. But 
my conversations with Precht since, and my own writing about legal and social developments 
after 9/11, see Sharon L. Davies, Profiling Terror, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 45 (2003), convince 
me that we share many concerns about the future of terrorism investigations and 
prosecutions. 
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Law Review would ask me to review the book that he would write 
about experiences as Mohammad's attorney. 
But life is filled with wondrous Jungian synchronicities and 
unexpected surprises. 
I. THETRIAL 
One need not have been involved in the 1993 case to have a more 
nuanced perspective today on the significance of the first bombing of 
the World Trade Center. For one, as Precht explains so well in his 
book, the failure of the perpetrators of the first bombing to bring the 
tower down created for many a false confidence in the indestructibility 
of the imposing structures, a confidence that continued to their 
collapse on September 11, 2001. Although it was apparent at the time 
of the 1993 bombing that the perpetrators could have inflicted far 
worse damage and loss of life had the buildings been less resistant to 
attack, those familiar with the North Tower were not surprised that it 
withstood the explosion. After all, the towers had been well built; they 
had been designed by folks who knew enough about the unpredictable 
nature of human conduct to consider in advance the possibility that a 
plane, even a fully fueled 707 aircraft, might be flown into one of them 
one day.10 The towers could withstand such an assault, its designers 
predicted, and the 1993 bombing seemed simply to prove the point. 
We know now, of course, that the buildings were not impervious. 
And, as a result, the "if onlys" that linger in the aftermath of the 9/11 
attacks on the towers are likely to haunt us forever. "If only" we had 
realized that the towers were more vulnerable than we thought they 
were. "If only" we could have predicted that as icons they would be 
too tempting a target ever to be safe from additional terrorist attacks.11 
And perhaps, "if only" we had considered more carefully the 
significance of Mohammad Salameh's and his co-defendants' defiant 
cries of protest and anger when the jury pronounced its verdicts of 
guilt upon each of them: "Victory to Islam!" "Injustice people!" "God 
is great!" "Cheap people, cheap government!" (p. 162). 
It is tempting to respond to such defiance and remorselessness with 
a defiance of one's own. To assuage our own lingering fears about 
10. Seep. 73 (referring to structural-engineer Leslie Robertson's testimony that the tow­
ers had been built to withstand the impact of "the largest jet aircraft in the air at the time"). 
11. During his opening remarks at Mohammad Salameh's trial, the federal prosecutor 
predicted that "February 26, 1993, would become a day that would mark for all time the 
single most destructive act of terrorism ever committed here in the United States." P. 61. 
Would that he had been right. But Timothy McVeigh's bombing of the Murrah Federal 
Building in Oklahoma City on April 19, 1995, resulting in the deaths of 168 innocents, would 
soon eclipse the destructiveness of the first bombing of the World Trade Center. The loss of 
nearly 3000 lives from the September 11, 2001 attacks would prove the prosecutor wrong 
yet again. 
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those who would do us such grievous harm with a lack of concern 
about the rights and treatment of those who fall (or even just might 
fall) within that group of enemies. It is tempting to get a machine gun. 
Such is the thought-bending power of fear. Rob Precht's powerful 
retelling of his experiences def ending one in this group of enemies, 
however, invites us to reach for a more deliberative response. For 
what we do to our enemies says much not only about the principles 
against which we would measure ourselves, but the steel of our very 
belief, or lack of belief, in our own system of justice. 
A. Remembrances of a Defense Attorney 
Defending Mohammad is a fast-moving read, dotted with frequent, 
highly moving descriptions of the complex, often-emotional 
relationship between an accused and his counsel. The author has a 
knack for capturing the grey in human relationships, and his best 
success at this is when he invites his readers into the exchanges that 
occurred between him and his young client over the course of twelve 
months after he accepted the assignment to serve as Salameh's counsel 
(p. 3), found himself in the heady vortex of what would surely be the 
most high profile case of his life, and thereafter struggled to keep his 
high profile client happy while attending to his legal defense. 
On a technical level, the book provides an excellent descriptive 
account of the various phases of a federal criminal trial. Precht 
explains the stages of the trial and pretrial process in a clear, coherent, 
and accessible way, making the text as accessible to the lay reader as it 
is to the legally-trained. The order of the account is, unsurprisingly 
chronological, beginning with a vivid recollection of the day when, 
shortly after the bombing, Precht received a late-afternoon call from 
prosecutor Henry DePippo asking him to come to the ceremonial 
courtroom to represent "the bomber" (pp. 2-3). 
Even from this early moment, the reader feels the weightiness of 
the terrorism charge and discerns the uniqueness of this client. 
Precht's description of his hurried first meeting with Salameh just 
before a hearing was held to determine the question of bail puts on 
self-conscious display the author's own cultural biases, challenging us 
to examine our own. "I expected to encounter a wild-eyed zealot," he 
writes (p. 3). "But the man sitting on the bench who looked up at me 
appeared quite ordinary. Mohammad Salameh was small, thin, in his 
mid-twenties, with a closely cropped beard, large nose, and brown 
eyes. He looked utterly defeated."12 After this introduction to 
12. P. 3. Precht confronts his cultural biases at a number of places in the book. For 
example, he describes his discomfort with Hassen Abdellah, the attorney for Mahmud 
Abouhalima, one of Salameh's co-defendants. Unlike Precht, Abdellah was able to speak 
with Mohammad and the other defendants in Arabic. Abdellah also tended to end strategy 
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Salameh, the book moves quickly, providing a rare opportunity to 
witness the development of the oddly mutually-dependent relationship 
that can develop between a suddenly infamous criminal defendant and 
the attorney who is left (because the client is in jail) as the accused's 
only public spokesperson. 
More fundamentally, the book raises serious questions about the 
rightness of arguments currently in vogue which would subject future 
terrorism suspects to expanded police powers during criminal 
investigations, while denying them the procedural protections to which 
they would normally be entitled after formal charges are lodged. The 
sections that follow immediately below provide an analysis of some of 
the memoir's many strengths. Part II then considers the book's more 
fundamental warning that, in moments of grave national insecurity, 
legislative and judicial officials tend to discount the value of civil 
liberties and procedural protections and overestimate the value of 
expanded police authority. 
1. Defense of the Possibly Guilty 
By the end of Defending Mohammad one feels that she has a much 
firmer understanding of how difficult it is to represent a client whom 
the country suspects is guilty and as a result is intent to loathe, and yet 
how electrifying it is to be the attorney at the center of a case as to 
which the public has a seemingly unsatiable interest.13 A particularly 
poignant example of one of the challenges is supplied by the author's 
recollection of a late-night confrontation on a Manhattan subway with 
a man who recognized Precht from one of his many televised 
interviews on Salameh's behalf. The man asked Precht accusingly how 
he would feel if he succeeded in getting Salameh and his co­
defendants acquitted, and then they did it again?14 The author wisely 
meetings involving the four defendants and their counsel by invoking Allah. Precht wrote 
about the experience: 
Islam still seemed like an impossibly remote and alien religion to me. I had grown up in 
Scarsdale, New York, my maternal grandmother was Jewish, and most of my friends were 
Jewish. In high school, I watched news clips of airliners blown up in the desert by Muslim 
fanatics . . . .  (M]y views of the religion were not positive. 
P. 56. In fact, Precht admits that Mohammad Salameh was the first Muslim "[he] had ever 
had an extended conversation with, and the circumstances of [their] coming together were 
hardly conducive to dispelling [liis] negative impressions of the religion." Pp. 56-57. 
13. Precht writes: "I had to admit that the allure of publicity was intoxicating. I told 
myself I was making statements to the media to protect my client's interests, but I also 
enjoyed the limelight." P. 23. 
14. The subway encounter occurred after Precht had given "hundreds of interviews to 
television, radio, and newspaper reporters" in connection with Salameh's defense, including 
appearances on the Larry King Show, ABC's Good Morning America, CBS's Morning 
Show, and NBC's Today Show. P. 12. Stepping closer to Precht, the middle-aged subway 
rider asked: 
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attempts to provide a fuller answer to his readers than the perfunctory 
one he offered to his subway interrogator. He reminds us of similar 
unpopular defenses taken on by such notables as John Adams (when 
he defended British soldiers who fought at the Boston Massacre) and 
Edward Bennett Williams (who represented Joseph McCarthy against 
censure by fellow senators), who were branded "traitor" (Adams) or 
"fascist" (Williams) for their efforts and lost many clients and 
supporters in the process (p. 77). 
This history lesson is fair as far as it goes, though it is impossible 
not to wonder why the author skips over more recent examples, like 
Johnnie Cochran, and his defense of O.J. Simpson. I suspect that it is 
because when answering a question as important as this - how can an 
attorney defend a client whom she personally thinks might be guilty? 
- one instinctively feels the need to be in the company of "great 
ones" who have made like choices in the past.15 But such grand 
company provides an unneeded shield. For even had Rob Precht no 
famed predecessors with whom he could join company, even had he 
been the very first to have got up the courage to come to the defense 
of a publicly unpopular defendant charged with a heinous or hated 
crime, he would have been right to do it. Our adversarial system of 
criminal justice depends on lawyers demanding that it live up to its 
rules. Rules that, among other things, require proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt and place the burden of proof on the shoulders of 
the party advancing the accusation of wrongdoing. As Precht explains, 
"Vigorous advocacy on behalf of every defendant, guilty or 
innocent . . .  serves to further 'society's determination to keep 
unsoiled and beyond suspicion the procedures by which men are 
condemned for a violation of its laws.' "16 
"How are you going to feel?" 
"I beg your pardon?" 
"How are you going to feel when you get them off?" 
"I don't know that's going to happen." 
"They're going to do it again. You know that, don't you? How are you going to feel?" 
"Look, sir, it's not for me to judge the defendants, it's the jury's job. I'm just trying to make 
sure my client gets a fair trial." 
"How do you feel about the pregnant lady who got killed? How do you feel tricking 
people?" 
I decided to get off at the next station, before my regular stop and rose from my seat. The 
subway pulled into the station. The doors opened. I walked out. 
From behind, I heard him shout. "This is just a game for you!" 
Pp. 76-77. 
15. As talented an attorney as Cochran may be, he has yet to rise to the level of Adams 
and Williams. 
16. P. 78 (quoting Lon Fuller, The Adversary System, in TALKS ON AMERICAN LAW 30, 
37 (Harold J. Berman ed., 1961)). 
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2. Fame 
With fame for the client comes fame for the lawyer, and as Precht 
describes so well in his memoir, such fame can be very seductive stuff. 
The media attention devoted to the 1993 bombing prosecution was 
fierce and unyielding, and all who played a part in the case 
experienced its intensity and the fame that accompanied it in very 
personal ways.17 For Precht, the attention was both exhilarating and 
addictive. "The case was a great break for my career," Precht recalls 
with refreshing honesty in his book, "I now had a public stage on 
which to act out my fantasies of being a Super Lawyer."18 Thus, when 
Judge Duffy, at the first pretrial conference, imposed a gag order on 
all of the attorneys in the case, forbidding any further statements to 
the press, Precht fought back with the determination of an addict 
looking for his next fix. Brushing aside his boss's advice that the gag 
order might just be "a blessing in disguise" (p. 21), Precht successfully 
appealed the issue to the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit, which lifted the gag order and issued a "sharply 
worded" reminder to the trial judge that such restrictions on attorneys 
were extreme measures to be imposed only upon a showing that 
permitting statements to be made to the press would make the 
possibility of a fair trial substantial unlikely, and a showing that the 
trial court had considered less extreme measures before imposing it.19 
A stern rebuke. 
As a matter of law, Precht was precisely right about the gag order, 
and he had the reversal order to prove it. As a matter of trial strategy, 
however, the reader is entitled to wonder (even before the author 
recounted what happened next) whether this would turn out to be a 
Pyrrhic victory. There were at least two reasons to fear that it would. 
First, Precht was himself concerned about the effect that the heavy 
publicity surrounding the case would have on the jury that was picked 
to decide the case. Thus the author asks much of his readers when 
later in the book he complains about that publicity and worries that it 
jeopardized his client's chance for a fair trial.20 It is difficult to be 
17. For Gil Childers, the lead prosecutor in the case, the extremely intense interest in 
the case resulted in fear for his and his family's safety. Gil received death threats while 
prosecuting the case. This was a rare occurrence for federal prosecutors, and thus I and the 
rest of the Assistant U.S. Attorneys in the office were made aware of it. 
18. P. 15. Hand in hand with the thrill of such newfound fame went the fear of losing it. 
The author recounts, for example, being fearful that Salameh would decide to fire him and 
hire someone else. See p. 15 ("I was like an insecure lover, and when Mohammad did not 
telephone me as he usually did, I became anxious."). 
19. See pp. 22-23; United States v. Salameh, 992 F.2d 445, 446 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing 
Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1038 (1991)). 
20. See p. 57 (arguing that "the jury selection process was not maximized to reveal 
whether jurors had been negatively influenced by the wealth of pretrial publicity," and 
complaining that leading questions asked by a judge whom the prospective jurors seemed to 
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sympathetic when the defense itself carried at least some of the 
responsibility for that publicity by making a conscious decision to use 
the media as a part of its strategy.21 Indeed, the trial court delighted in 
reminding Precht about the cost of having its gag order vacated when 
it denied his pretrial motion for a change of venue.22 
Nevertheless, to be fair, had Precht submitted to the gag order, 
there seems little reason to believe that the media's interest in the case 
would have subsided. In such a case, even if the prosecutors refused to 
pass along information to satisfy that hunger (and I believe they would 
have refused) there was no assurance that an agent or other person 
knowledgeable about the government's case would have been equally 
circumspect. If information advantageous to the prosecution 
continued to leak, as Precht feared it would, he truly would have been 
between a rock and a hard place, having been ordered not to talk by 
the judge and thus having no way to defend his client in the court of 
public opinion. 
An additional, and more pragmatic, reason counseled against 
seeking an appeal of the gag order - the judge who had made that 
order was slated to preside over the trial, and having him reversed 
before the trial was hardly likely to endear the lawyer to him. That 
Rob Precht was willing to press on with the appeal is a credit to his 
courage and commitment to his client, for this judge in particular was 
not known for pulling his punches when angered.23 
look up to and wanted to please were not apt to ferret out those whose views had been 
tainted by the heavy publicity that preceded the trial). 
21. See p. 12 (noting that Precht's boss, Leonard Joy, booked him on the Larry King 
Show so that he could respond to the information being given to the media by federal 
authorities). 
22. The motion was based on the ground that no New York City jury would be able to 
ignore the publicity that had been leaked to the press before the trial and decide the case 
impartially. Judge Duffy was unsympathetic: 
Counsel for Salameh points a finger at the Government for this state of affairs. The fault, as 
counsel knows full well, however, does not lie with the Government. This court attempted to 
prevent the dissemination of prejudicial publicity by imposing a "gag order" upon the 
attorneys and their agents at the time the matter initially came before me. Counsel for 
Salameh strenuously objected to this order, and successfully had it vacated by the Court of 
Appeals. In effect, counsel is really complaining that he was unable to "control" the 
publicity. 
P. 46. 
23. The book details a number of incidents after the gag-order reversal hinting that 
Precht's decision to appeal may have soured the judge's view of the lawyer permanently. 
The Judge referred to the lawyer as "Bobby" rather than Rob, for example, when 
introducing him to prospective jurors during jury selection, see p. 47, a slight that seemed 
intentionally designed to belittle the attorney. The venom in the trial court's rejection of the 
defendant's motion for a change of venue specifically referenced Precht's decision to appeal 
the gag order is another example. See p. 46. 
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3. Second Thoughts 
Second guessing one's strategic calls is inevitable, whether one is 
on the defense or prosecutorial side, and Rob Precht is no exception. 
For example, he wonders out loud in his book whether he should have 
filed a motion to recuse Judge Duffy after the judge tipped his hand 
and revealed that he had been privy to information that Salameh's co­
defendants had at some point admitted their roles in the conspiracy -
and had pointed the finger at Salameh as well.24 Judge Duffy told 
Precht that due to that information he was fairly sure that Salameh 
was in fact guilty, and this caused the experienced federal defender to 
conclude in his book that the judge could not be fair to his client. 
I am not sure. Certainly no one familiar with Judge Duffy would 
consider him a soft touch, but there is little in Precht's account of the 
trial to indicate that the judge treated Salameh unfairly (although he 
was certainly not gentle with Precht) (p. 54). To the contrary, the 
judge seemed to exercise real patience with Salameh. For example, 
when Salameh refused one day to come to court until the judge held a 
private session with him to talk about his complaints about his prison 
conditions, Judge Duffy held that meeting with the defendant, and 
Precht himself depicts the judge's response during the meeting as 
"patient[]," attentive, and polite. It is true that several motions were 
decided against the defense, including a motion for a change of 
venue,25 a motion to reveal the identify of an unindicted co­
conspirator,26 and a motion for a mistrial after the federal prosecutor 
remarked in his opening statement that, after the explosion, the nation 
understood in a new way that terrorism was no longer a problem for 
the rest of the world, but could happen to us here.27 But there is no 
reason to think that those motions would (or should) have been 
decided any other way by any other judge in the courthouse. In this 
respect, the reader may find Precht's understanding of the pressures 
on prosecutorial team28 and the trial judge29 less nuanced than his fine 
24. He worries similarly about his cross-examination choices, but here seems as willing 
to second guess the examinations conducted by his co-counsel as his own. Precht adds to this 
additional, engaging descriptions of missteps of his co-defense counsel and the prosecutor. 
See chapter 10. This is high drama, and grist for the mill of every evidence professor who 
teaches her students not to ask open-ended "why" questions on cross-examination. 
25. See pp. 44-46. 
26. See pp. 24-30. 
27. See p. 64. Defense counsel argued that the opening went beyond the charges in the 
indictment, and essentially pitted a group of "foreign alien defendants" against "We the 
Americans" in the first chapter of "a war of terrorism on the United States." P. 64. 
28. But now and then even the prosecutor is humanized. Gil is described in a fairly 
complimentary way at various points. See pp. 46-47, 159-60. 
29. For example, as is the custom in every federal courtroom, the judge's entry is 
preceded by that of a clerk who announces the judge's arrival with a commanding "All 
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depictions of the interactions with his client and the year-long 
development of their relationship. If so, this is a weakness that can be 
forgiven, for it is evident throughout the narrative that what the 
author is really retelling here is the defense's experience of the trial. 
The insider view that this account provides itself makes the book well 
worth the read. 
4. The Unbearable Lightness of a Defense 
Another of the book's real strengths is the way in which the author 
conveys the difficulties counsel face when deciding upon the best 
defense strategy, a difficulty that in this case was exacerbated by 
several factors, including: the limited access Precht had to his 
incarcerated client (p. 40), the cultural gulf that continued to torment 
the two men throughout the course of the representation,30 the 
tensions and conflicts that arise when multiple defendants who are 
tried together choose different lines of attack on the prosecution's 
evidence (pp. 43-44), and the sheer volume of that evidence. 
As to the evidence, conviction of the four defendants accused of 
involvement in the 1993 Trade Center bombing was by no means a 
lock. As pointed out in the book, the prosecution's case was entirely 
circumstantial (p. 156). There were no eye witnesses to the bombing 
and no one to identify the person who drove the bomb-carrying van 
into the garage below the tower on the day of the attack. The prompt 
arrest and conviction of all four defendants then, is creditable to the 
abilities of the prosecutorial and investigative team of individuals who 
weaved together a mass of evidence that linked the defendants to each 
other, the chemicals that were used to make the bomb, the storage 
locker in which those chemicals were kept for a time, the apartment in 
which the bomb was constructed, and the van that was used to 
transport it to the site of the explosion. The fact that the prosecution 
was able to do this also shows that, contrary to popular belief, the lack 
of direct evidence is hardly fatal to a criminal case. Indeed, quite 
often, the multi-layered process of drawing connections between those 
standing accused of working together to commit a crime, of linking 
them to the ingredients that made the crime possible, as well as the 
location at which it occurred, can be more convincing than a case 
based on direct identification evidence. 
Rise!" But unlike the other judges in the Manhattan courthouse, Judge Duffy "walked into 
the courtroom . . .  telling people to 'sit down, sit down' as soon as he got through the door 
and well before he actually reached the bench." P. 59. Unlike Precht, who thought this all an 
act, a pretense of disdain for the normal rituals of respect owing a federal judge, I found this 
a genuine reflection of the judge's lack of regard for pomp and circumstance. 
30. See 116 (relating how Salameh told his lawyer that the lawyer would never 
understand him). 
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Such circumstantial proof, if it holds together, often severely limits 
the trial strategies available to defense counsel. In this case, for 
example, the prosecutors alleged that Mohammad Salameh's role in 
the offense included opening a joint bank account with co-defendant 
Ayyad into which funds were deposited to finance the making of the 
bomb (p. 62). Other evidence showed that money from that account 
was used to rent a storage shed in Jersey City, New Jersey (pp. 62-63). 
Still more proof established: the presence of chemicals in that shed, 
which were consistent with the chemicals in the bomb that went off in 
the World Trade Center tower; that Salameh helped to find and rent 
the apartment in which those chemicals were fashioned into a bomb; 
that the co-defendants were in frequent telephone contact with each 
other throughout the period of the bomb plot; that Mohammad rented 
the Ryder van which would be shown to have contained the 
homemade bomb; that an anonymous letter to the New York Times 
taking credit for the bombing could be linked to Mohammad's co­
conspirator, Ayyad; that his other co-defendants Yousef, Abouhalima 
and Yasin fled the country immediately after the bombing occurred; 
and that Salameh would have done the same had he not been arrested 
first (p. 64). 
To be sure, a jury might find some or even all of these pieces of 
evidence unconvincing when tested against the beyond-a-reasonable­
doubt standard. But if pretrial discovery of the prosecution's proof 
could convince defense counsel that the allegations likely could be 
proved, a wide array of otherwise possible defenses would disappear 
as quickly as did the walls and other supports of the World Trade 
Center garage. Put slightly differently, if the prosecution could prove 
that co-defendants Nidal Ayyad and Mohammad Salameh had in fact 
opened a joint account together, out of which funds were used to rent 
a storage facility in which bomb-making chemicals were stored, at 
minimum a juror would likely want to know the innocent explanation 
for that account and the innocent purpose for the storage-facility 
rental. Certainly that proof would make it impossible to claim that the 
government's case was simply one of mistaken identity (i.e., that the 
bank account belonged to another, or that the person who rented the 
storage facility or apartment or van was someone else). Further, if the 
evidence of the association between these defendants effectively tied 
them to these instrumentalities of the crime, the defense would be left 
with little to argue but that the accused lacked knowledge of the 
purpose for which the money or van were to be used. And after 
reviewing the government's discovery, this was precisely the 
conclusion Rob Precht reached on behalf of his client prior to the start 
of the trial - his best defense was lack of knowledge of the bomb 
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plot.31 This meant that if Mohammad Salameh was to be acquitted it 
would be because his able lawyer had succeeded in convincing the jury 
that, at minimum, there was reason to doubt that Salameh knew what 
his acquaintances had been up to. His client, Precht would argue, had 
been duped.32 
As with other decisions, in his reminiscences about the trial the 
author spends a considerable amount of time second guessing this 
defense strategy, as well as his decision to sum up the case in the way 
that he did, a summation that resulted in his client sending a letter to 
the judge in complaint (p. 147). In the summation as at trial, Precht 
stressed his "dupe" theory, arguing that even if the government's 
proof established his client's association with the other defendants, it 
did not show beyond a reasonable doubt that Salameh knew what the 
others were up to prior to the bombing (p. 140). This line of argument 
angered the other defendants who preferred to keep a unified front 
and would have had Precht argue simply that the government's 
evidence failed to stand up to scrutiny.33 The problem was (as the 
verdicts later showed) the government's evidence did stand up to 
scrutiny, as Precht suspected it would.34 Thus, however unpopular, he 
cannot fairly be faulted for choosing his "dupe" approach over that 
preferred by the other attorneys at the defense table. 
Rob Precht does not concede in his book that the similar tact that 
he took in summation was in fact at odds with Salameh's wishes (pp. 
146, 149), despite his client's letter to the judge suggesting that it was 
(pp. 146, 149), and a telephone interview that Salameh gave to a 
reporter from Reuters the day after the summation during which 
Salameh criticized his attorney for conceding there had been a 
conspiracy to bomb the Trade Center and maintaining that the 
mastermind of that conspiracy had duped him (p. 147). Precht 
maintains that he agreed to both press the dupe theory35 and attack 
31. The author recalled in the book, "I did not attempt to challenge the physical 
evidence, and I tacitly accepted the government's proof that Mohammad had rented the 
storage locker, the house, and the van that carried the bomb. But I maintained that he 
truthfully reported the van stolen hours before the explosion." P. 65. 
32. For the other defendants who were not as easily connected to the funds and storage 
locker and van used in the bombing plot, there were other defenses available. One argued 
that the prosecution was merely seeking a scapegoat for the explosion, "pandering to the 
jury's patriotic sympathies" and building its case on "rhetoric" rather than facts. See p. 66. 
Another pointed out that it was impossible for his client to have been involved, as he was in 
jail at the time the explosion occurred. See p. 66. 
33. One of the defense attorneys was so upset that he moved for a mistrial on the 
ground that Precht had done "more damage to [his client] in the first six minutes or so of his 
summation than [the prosecutor] did in the six hours of his summation." P. 143. 
34. Seep. 134 ("[T]he volume of evidence against Mohammad was truly staggering."). 
35. See pp. 135-37 (recounting part of the summation where Precht argued Salameh was 
manipulated by Ramzi Yousef, a fugitive in Iraq at the time of the trial). 
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the strength of the prosecution's proof.36 At the last minute, however, 
the lawyer decided to hit hardest the idea that the evidence was 
insufficient to show that Salameh knew the true purpose to which the 
storage locker he rented, the apartment he secured, and the van he 
leased would be put.37 And it was this call that earned Precht the ire of 
both his client and his fellow defense attorneys. 
As to which was the better defense for his client, Precht's judgment 
was clearly the wiser call.38 But his decision to emphasize that 
argument over Salameh's preferred attack raises an interesting 
question about the ethical obligations of a defense attorney who fears 
that his client's strategic preferences will lead to sure conviction. 
Against heavy criticism that the client, not the attorney, must be left to 
make such calls, Precht defends his contrary view as follows: 
I do not believe that a defendant can or should dictate tactics .... ABA 
model rule 1.2(a) says that a lawyer is required to abide by the client's 
decisions concerning the "objectives of representation." To me that 
means that a lawyer must abide by a client's decision whether to go to 
trial to contest the charges, to plead guilty to avoid a long prison term, to 
cooperate with government authorities, and the like. Beyond that, it is 
the lawyer's call as to how best to achieve these objectives. The lawyer 
should consult with the client, but the lawyer has the final say as to 
tactics. (p. 150) 
Precht is right. It is certainly true that the client has the ultimate 
authority to determine the objectives of litigation at least within legal 
limits, and once set, an attorney has a professional obligation to abide 
by her client's directives in that regard.39 Nevertheless, the means by 
which an attorney seeks to achieve those objectives are largely within 
her discretion.40 Thus, while the client has the plain authority to make 
such a decision as whether to testify at trial, to accept a plea offer, to 
plead guilty, and to waive his right to a jury trial,41 in the famous words 
36. See pp. 137-38 (recounting the part of the summation where Precht challenged the 
proof connecting Salameh to the storage locker rental application, pointed out that the 
person who took a cash deposit on the apartment from Salameh had not actually seen him 
move into the apartment, etc.). 
-
37. The author himself acknowledges this. See p. 149 ("I certainly did not think revers­
ing the order of the arguments and shortening my attack on the physical evidence when the 
jury started to lose interest was a major departure from the strategy we had agreed on."). 
38. When the attorney for one of the other defendants moved for a mistrial based on 
Precht's summation, the judge denied the request and stated, to the contrary, that the 
summation "may have been Mr. Salameh's best chance." P. 144. 
39. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1 .2(a) (1983). 
40. See MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-101.B (1980); see also ABA, 
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 4-5.2 (1993). 
41. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 93 n.1 (1977). 
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of one trial lawyer, the attorney is "not a potted plant."42 Determining 
the trial or appellate strategy that is most likely to achieve the client's 
stated objectives is a decision left largely to the attorney.43 And, absent 
a strong showing of ineffective representation, the lawyer cannot be 
faulted simply because her strategic decisions were unable to win 
the day. 
II. DEFENDING THE MOHAMMADS OF THE FUTURE 
As this Part shows, Defending Mohammad delivers an engaging 
and informative account of the trial of the four individuals convicted 
of carrying out the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center from the 
perspective of an attorney assigned to defend the case. The book 
reminds us that every criminal trial is an unfolding human drama, and 
advances the reader's understanding of the way in which our system of 
justice strove, even if imperfectly, to deliver justice in a single case. 
But it also does more than that. The book's deeper contribution is the 
questions it raises about the nation's future responses to terrorist 
threats. What made the 1993 crime so significant, the author reminds 
us, was the sense of vulnerability that lingered in the explosion's wake 
and the impact such vulnerability can have on our commitments to our 
own justice system and the rules that govern official investigations. As 
Precht puts it, "On trial were not simply the defendants' deeds, but the 
threat of terrorism" (p. 61). He thus pauses toward the end of the 
book to consider the future of terrorism investigations and 
prosecutions, and the nation's tendency in times of widespread 
national fear and insecurity to submit perhaps too easily to reductions 
in rights and liberties. The author points to two ways in which this 
erosion of liberties had begun to happen in the wake of the 9/11 
attacks: 1) through acquiescence to the use of torture on terrorism 
suspects;44 and 2) by increased reliance on military tribunals.45 
42. Comment of attorney Brendan Sullivan while defending Oliver North at the Iran­
Contra hearings. 
43. See, e.g., Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745 (1983). 
44. Although the government has yet to state that it has used torture as a tool in its "war 
on terror," a number of scholars have argued that it could. See, e.g., Oren Gross, The 
Prohibition on Torture and the Limits of the Law, in TORTURE (Sanford Levinson ed., 
Oxford Univ. Press, forthcoming in 2004). Arguments on various grounds that torture may 
be acceptable in some circumstances are not new. See, e.g., THOMAS NAGEL, MORTAL 
QUESTIONS 56 (1979) (arguing that when special conditions exist "it may become impossible 
to adhere to an absolutist position"); Michael S. Moore, Torture and the Balance of Evils, 23 
ISR. L. REV. 280 (1989). 
45. In November 2001, President Bush issued a military order that dispensed with 
criminal trials and authorized the trial of aliens accused of terrorist acts or harboring 
terrorists before military tribunals. Such trials could be held in secret and be based on 
classified information as to which the accused would have no right of access; the normal 
rules of evidence would not apply; there would be no jury right, conviction could be had 
upon 2/3 agreement of the military officers who presided over the proceeding; there was no 
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Precht's account of the 1993 trial can help the reader assess for 
herself the necessity for such measures, including in particular the 
necessity of an extra-civilian court system for the adjudication of 
future terrorism cases.46 If anything, the successful prosecution of 
Mohammad Salameh and his co-defendants suggests that the criminal 
justice system was well-enough equipped in 1993 to apprehend such 
wrongdoers and to bring them swiftly to justice. Thus one is entitled to 
question whether dramatic modification of our rules and system are 
truly needed to redress future acts of terror. Although clearly 
concerned about the fairness of the judicial process afforded 
Mohammad Salameh, Rob Precht's belief in the ability of the civilian 
judicial system to ensure a fair trial to individuals charged with 
terrorist acts remained largely unshaken after defending the case. He 
writes toward the end of his book: 
It especially seems premature to give up on the criminal justice system 
when there is no evidence that the system is unable to handle terrorism 
cases. The 1993 Trade Center trial was swift, and it did not disclose 
government secrets. While I believe the trial was unfair, the fault was not 
that the system lacked safeguards. Rather, the participants failed to use 
them. Jury trials are not perfect . .. .  Nevertheless, the jury trial system is 
premised on the idea of impartiality, a concept alien to military tribunals, 
which lack any safeguards for insuring it .... The best weapon we have 
against terrorist is not our passions. It is the rule of law. (p. 169) 
I would add to Precht's list of reflections about the future of 
terrorism investigations one other concern that, to date, has received 
far less scholarly attention than those the author raises in his memoir: 
the weakening of federal constitutional restrictions on police power to 
detain and gather evidence from groups of people without having to 
satisfy the "reasonable suspicion" standard.47 In the space that remains 
here, I will focus on that concern, and the way in which the U.S. 
Supreme Court's recent decisions in Illinois v. Lidster48 and United 
States v. Flores-Montano49 make this an additional topic of concern. 
right of appeal and the penalty could be death. See A copy of the Military Order issued on 
Nov. 13, 2001 can be found at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/ll/20011113-
27.html. 
46. I have written elsewhere about a third area in which the public seems willing to 
demand less of its government officials in a time of terror - by permitting (if not 
encouraging) ethnic profiling. See Davies, supra note 9, at 45; see also William J. Stuntz, 
Local Policing after the Terror, 111 YALE L.J. 2137 (2002); Samuel R. Gross & Debra 
Livingston, Racial Profiling Under Attack, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1413 (2002); Muller, supra 
note 2. 
47. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968) (establishing the reasonable-suspicion 
standard as the justification demanded by the Fourth Amendment to conduct a temporary 
seizure of an individual). 
48. 124 S. Ct. 885 (2004). 
49. 124 S. Ct. 1582 (2004). 
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For although the facts of Lidster and Flores-Montano involve no acts 
of terrorism, the Justices' unanimous agreement that suspicionless 
group seizures (Lidster) and searches (Flores-Montano) are in some 
circumstances constitutionally defensible can be understood, I think, 
only in an age of terror, and we would be wise carefully to consider the 
implications of such broadened police power. 
In my earlier article, Profiling Terror,50 I challenged arguments 
advanced by a number of prominent criminal-procedure scholars after 
the 9/11 attacks defending more-liberal profiling practices targeting 
Arabs and Muslims in terrorism investigations. Harvard Law 
Professor William Stuntz was among those scholars, and he argued 
(quite presciently as it turns out) that, as is true after any crime wave, 
after 9/11 it was inevitable that both legislative and judicial steps 
would be taken to trim individual rights and expand police powers.51 
This was not a development to be avoided, Professor Stuntz argued 
further. To the contrary, the police should be given more robust 
authority to seize and search groups of individuals without 
individualized suspicion of wrongdoing. Civil libertarians should 
concern themselves not with the fact that the police were permitted to 
do so more easily,52 but with the manner in which those police-citizen 
contacts occurred.53 If this new authority was conferred upon the 
police, as Professor Stuntz thought it should be, it would result in 
(among other things) expanded police power to set up highway 
checkpoints in traditional criminal-investigative settings, and 
expanded power to conduct searches of individuals and their property 
without the necessity of a showing of exceptional need or 
individualized suspicion.54 And the best restriction on such 
suspicionless searches and seizures, Professor Stuntz argued, would be 
ex post judicial review of the manner in which the encounters 
occurred. 
At the time Professor Stuntz made this argument, the prospect that 
a police right to conduct suspicionless group searches and seizures 
would materialize seemed fairly remote, even to those most fearful 
that individual rights and liberties were being trimmed and 
50. See Davies, supra note 9. 
51. See Stuntz, supra note 46, at 2142-60. 
52 See id. at 2163. 
53. See id. at 2173. Stuntz argues that the line between valid and invalid police intrusions 
should be changed from the (then) sharp focus separating seizures/non-seizures and 
searches/non-searches to a "hazier" line separating "decent" from "indecent" police 
behavior. Id. at 2174 ("Worrying about how street stops happen makes more sense than 
worrying about how many of them happen.") (emphasis added). 
54. See id. at 2164-65. 
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investigative authority broadened in the wake of the 9/11 attacks.55 
After all, the Supreme Court had considered and rejected the 
constitutionality of a highway checkpoint only a year before those 
attacks, where the primary purpose of the roadblock was to discover 
and interdict illegal narcotics. In City of Indianapolis v. Edmond,56 the 
Court reminded the nation's police forces that a "search or seizure is 
ordinarily unreasonable in the absence of individualized suspicion of 
wrongdoing."57 Thus, the drug checkpoint was unconstitutional 
because its primary purpose was "to advance 'the general interest in 
crime control' "58 rather than to address the special and challenging 
"problems of policing the border"59 or "the necessity of ensuring 
roadway safety,"60 or some other limited administrative or "special 
need."61 "We have never approved a checkpoint program whose 
primary purpose was to detect evidence of ordinary criminal 
wrongdoing," wrote Justice O'Connor for the Edmond majority, for 
fear that any such holding would allow such intrusions to become "a 
routine part of American life."62 
1. Suspicionless Group Seizures - Illinois v. Lidster - The 
"Seeking Information " Exception to the Reasonable-Suspicion 
Requirement 
In light of this holding, few save perhaps Professor Stuntz would 
have guessed (never mind advocated) that suspicionless stops of 
groups of motorists and suspicionless searches of their vehicles would 
soon be declared constitutionally permissible investigative techniques. 
In January 2004, however, the Court unanimously upheld a 
suspicionless roadblock in connection with a murder investigation in 
Lidster, and in March 2004 it unanimously agreed that a suspicionless 
55. See id. at 2164 (acknowledging that "with a few limited exceptions . . .  the law holds 
that police may not seize groups of people unless each individualized seizure is justified"). 
56. 531 U.S. 32 (2000). 
57. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 37. 
58. Id. at 44 (quoting Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 659 n.18 (1979)). 
59. Id. at 41; see, e.g., United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976) (approving 
suspicionless stops at a fixed border checkpoint designed to intercept undocumented aliens). 
60. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 41; see also Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 
447-48 (1990) (approving suspicionless stops of motorists in connection with highway 
sobriety checkpoint program); Prouse, 440 U.S. at 661 (approving suspicionless stops for a 
spot check of motorists' licenses and vehicle registrations). 
61. Sitz, 496 U.S. at 450; see also Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995) 
(involving random drug testing of student athletes); Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 
489 U.S. 602 (1989) (involving more selective drug or alcohol testing of railroad employees 
who had been involved in accidents or violated a safety regulation). 
62. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 41-42. 
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search of a car crossing the border into the United States violated no 
Fourth Amendment norm. Neither case directly involved a terrorism 
investigation, but both are best understood as examples of justice in 
the time of terror. 
The facts of Lidster, in brief, were these. A hit-and-run driver 
struck and killed a 70-year-old bicyclist on the side of an Illinois 
highway just after midnight. Approximately one week later, local 
police authorities set up a highway checkpoint at the same time of 
night in the same location, stopping all motorists for ten to fifteen 
seconds, ostensibly to hand each motorist a flyer which requested 
assistance in identifying the hit-and-run driver, and to ask each 
motorist if "they had seen anything happen there the previous 
weekend. "63 When Lidster's car approached the roadblock it swerved, 
nearly hitting an officer, and a sobriety test revealed that he had been 
drinking. He was subsequently arrested and convicted on a DUI 
charge.64 
Lidster appealed his conviction on the ground that the police stop 
of his car without reasonable suspicion was unconstitutional under the 
rule of Edmond. 65 Like the Indianapolis drug-checkpoint program, the 
primary purpose of the Illinois checkpoint was to gather evidence of 
"ordinary criminal wrongdoing," Lidster argued, making it violation of 
his Fourth Amendment right to be free of an unreasonable seizure. 
The Supreme Court disagreed. Unlike in Edmond, Justice Breyer 
wrote, the Illinois police had stopped cars in the hit-and-run case "not 
to determine whether a vehicle's occupants were committing a crime, 
but to ask the vehicle occupants, as members of the public, for their 
help in providing information about a crime in all likelihood 
committed by others."66 This different type of suspicionless group stop 
was thus not analogous to the kind of stop before the Edmond Court, 
Justice Breyer explained, and the Fourth Amendment demanded no 
"Edmond-type rule of automatic unconstitutionality." To the contrary, 
such "information-seeking"67 seizures could be upheld, the Court 
concluded, provided they were brief and thus "interfered only 
minimally with the liberty of the sort the Fourth Amendment seeks to 
protect"; the concern generating the seizures was "grave"; and the 
stops were conducted "systematically" with no allegation that the 
63. Illinois v. Lidster, 124 S. Ct. 885, 888 (2004). 
64. See id. 
65. 531 U.S. 32 (2000). 
66. Lidster, 124 S. Ct. at 889 (second emphasis added). 
67. Id. at 889. 
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police "acted in a discriminatory or otherwise unlawful manner while 
questioning motorists."68 
2. The Power to Conduct Suspicionless Searches - United States v. 
Flores-Montano 
In Flores-Montano69 the Court extended this seizure reasoning to 
border vehicle searches. The case involved a customs search of the 
respondent's car as it attempted to enter the country at a port of entry 
on the California-Mexico border. Customs officials found and seized 
thirty-seven kilograms of marijuana in the gas tank of the car after an 
inspector tapped the tank, determined that it "sounded solid," and 
ordered the tank's physical removal from the undercarriage of the car, 
a process that took about an hour to complete.70 Rather than argue 
that the result of the tapping gave the government officials reason to 
suspect the presence of narcotics in the tank, and therefore a valid 
basis for investigating further,71 the government "advised the District 
Court that it was not relying on reasonable suspicion" to meet Flores­
Montano's motion to suppress the drugs.72 Rather, no individualized 
suspicion is constitutionally required in order to remove, disassemble 
and reassemble a fuel tank of a car seeking entry into the country, the 
government urged. The Court unanimously agreed, in light of "the 
longstanding right of the sovereign to protect itself by stopping and 
examining persons and property crossing into this country. "73 Such 
searches are reasonable per se "simply by virtue of the fact that they 
occur at the border."74 
Significantly, the government did not even bother to argue the 
presence of individualized suspicion in these two cases, an argument 
that might well have saved the stop (Lidster) and search (Flores­
Montano) without breaking any new jurisprudential ground.75 Its 
choice to eschew reliance on the reasonable-suspicion standard in both 
68. Id. at 891 (noting also that the police "were investigating a crime that had resulted in 
a human death"). 
69. 124 S. Ct. 1582 (2004). 
70. See id. at 1584. 
71. See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (2d ed. 1996). 
72 Flores-Montano, 124 S. Ct. at 1584-85. 
73. Id. at 1585 (quoting United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616 (1977)). 
74. Id. (quoting Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 616). The Flores-Montano Court later cites United 
States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 538 (1985), for the proposition that "the 
expectation of privacy is less at the border than it is in the interior." Flores-Montano, 124 S. 
Ct. at 1586. 
75. There is a fair argument that the police had an individualized basis in both cases, 
based on Lidster's plainly impaired operation of his vehicle (his swerve), and the solid sound 
of Flores-Montana's gas tank when tapped. 
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cases illustrates that its true goal was to expand the authority for 
government investigators. If there ever was a time to press the 
argument for such an expansion, it was after 9/11. The effect of the 
decisions is a further reduction in the importance of the line separating 
seizures from non-seizures and searches from non-searches. Terry v. 
Ohio chipped away at that line some years ago when the Court held 
that a seizure, if temporary, and a search (frisk), if limited in scope, 
could be justified by reasonable suspicion rather than probable cause. 
Lidster and Flores-Montano go farther still, raising grave questions 
about the importance of the search/seizure line of cases. At minimum, 
the Fourth Amendment seems now to erect a three-tiered system, 
distinguishing between full-blown searches and seizures (arrests) 
which require probable cause, temporary searches and seizures (Terry 
stops and frisks) which require reasonable suspicion, and other 
miscellaneous searches and seizures justified by a variety of 
circumstantial factors (e.g., searches at the borders, seizures of 
innocents for information-seeking purposes only) which require no 
individualized suspicion. 
On one level it is impressive that Professor Stuntz was able to 
predict that all of this would happen in the aftermath of the 9/11 
attacks, and although I continue to disagree with the normative 
arguments he has advanced in favor of these developments,76 I bow 
to his powers of clairvoyance.77 On the other hand, perhaps one need 
not be blessed with the powers of a fortune-teller to be able to 
predict with fair accuracy that measures such as these are likely to 
be proposed and adopted in the wake of an event that leaves the 
country fearful of its safety from future threats. For never is our 
confidence in our own rules and systemic procedures so easily shaken 
as when (in the words of one truck driver's bumper sticker) "the going 
gets tough." 
76. See Davies, supra note 9, at 82-93. 
77. As put by Professor Stuntz before Lidster or Flores-Montano: 
What I propose here is no more than what was at stake in Edmond. The roadblock in 
Edmond involved brief detentions in public, along with a few minutes of police questioning 
and, sometimes, a brief search of a suspect's outer clothing and the inside of her car. These 
are the usual incidents of a Terry stop and frisk. They should be within the scope of police 
authority, not only when the police have reasonable suspicion of both a crime and the 
presence of a weapon, but also when the people seized and searched qualify as a group. 
Stuntz, supra note 46, at 2168. 
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CONCLUSION 
To all but his lawyer and others who knew him personally,78 
Mohammad Salameh quickly became a distant memory. This is not 
uncommon, despite the importance of his case, for the human drama 
involved in any individual case dissipates quickly once a trial court 
pronounces its sentence. Indeed, it is the rare case that will reengage 
the public's interest after a sentence is upheld on appeal. That Rob 
Precht's Defending Mohammad is able to do so is a testament to the 
author's storytelling skills and the powerful emotions that he manages 
to convey when describing young Mohammad Salameh and his own 
roller-coaster ride as the attorney who unexpectedly found himself in 
charge of his defense. 
Even more importantly, Defending Mohammad challenges us to 
pause before concurring with those who claim that dramatic 
reductions in liberties and rights and expansions to police power are 
needed to protect against future acts of terrorism. At the bottom, such 
claims are persuasive only in a time of fear. They take hold and thrive 
only when the public is left so unsure of its security that it is willing to 
turn a blind eye to processes that distinguish our system of justice 
from all others. It is claims such as these that permit our detractors to 
point to abuses such as those in Abu Ghraib as illustrating American 
"justice" rather than the opposite of it. 
The investigation of the 1993 bombing of the Trade Center and the 
successful prosecution of those responsible for that crime is a powerful 
reminder that the best answer to lawlessness is not, as some seem 
currently to believe, more of the same. The best answer to lawlessness 
is, and always has been, an unswerving commitment to the law, 
perhaps especially when the going gets tough. 
78. Judge Duffy sentenced Salameh to 240 years in prison, a sentence calculated "by 
figuring the life expectancy of each of the six people killed in the bombing and subtracting 
the number of years left in their lives." P. 165. The sentence was upheld on appeal. P. 165. 
